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Abstract. This paper argues that for the study and facilitation of collaborative 
learning, existing theories of grounding such as that of Clark and Shaefer [5] 
cannot be applied without adjustments. When comparing collaborative learning 
and conversation, four dimensions can be identified where grounding at a 
knowledge level differs from the grounding at an utterance level. Firstly, the in-
direct access and the existence of a range of manifest meanings, poses the need 
for a notion of ‘groundedness’. Secondly, we propose providing evidence in 
‘co-referenced actions’ to be an important process as well as an additional 
marker to assess grounding. Thirdly, instead of simply repairing misunderstand-
ings after they arise, ‘perspective taking’ becomes a more prominent mecha-
nism. Fourthly, effort into grounding is turned from needing to be minimised, 
into needing to be ‘optimised’. 
1   Introduction 
Many studies of computer supported collaborative learning (CSCL) that identify 
grounding as an important process, analyse it using the theory of (or models based on) 
Clark and Shaefer [5]. However, the application of their theory within the field of 
CSCL holds some problems. As a linguistic theory, it analyses conversation on a 
micro or ‘utterance’ level and is not developed to describe the macro or ‘knowledge’ 
level, which is associated with learning. While the micro level focuses on the dialogue 
interchange occurring between two or more interlocutors, the macro level refers to the 
shared understanding that is constructed as a consequence of that exchange [10]. We 
argue that the observable presentation and acceptation of utterances, as described in 
Clark and Shaefer's contribution theory, cannot automatically be translated into the 
sharing of knowledge. As Koschmann’s [14] example of a learning conversation 
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between surgeon and student in an operation room shows, even repeated presentation 
and acceptation phases of a concrete referent in a shared environment, can result in 
different personal representations at a knowledge level.  
 Since language is not a direct translation of a speaker or writer’s knowledge, the 
interaction between knowledge and language that we find within CSCL, is a complex 
one [1]. While everyday human interaction has developed to be very efficient in the 
recognition of mutual intentions, communicating about knowledge (or ‘semantic 
grounding’ [2]) cannot automatically rely on the same unproblematic and self-
regulating character of ‘grounding-for-conversation’. Our reason for stressing this, is 
while we believe in the great potential of communication to produce learning, we 
want to caution that not all communication will automatically do so. When analysing 
or designing for collaborative learning, we need to take into account the idea that 
successful conversation is not necessarily the same as successful knowledge sharing. 
To explore the complex interaction between conversation and learning, this article 
will investigate the (subtle) differences of the characteristics, evidence, principles and 
mechanisms of grounding at the micro and macro level. To give this a practical con-
text, we will present two examples: the use of mobile messaging for a spatial collabo-
ration task 1.1, and the use of asynchronous electronic discussion for collaborative 
text processing 1.2. 
1.1   Example A 
In this first example1, we will illustrate the limited information that acknowledge-
ments give us about grounding at a knowledge level with an instance of human-to-
human IT mediated communication, where two agents are coordinating for a meeting 
in an urban environment. The two peers exchange messages using an SMS (Short 
Messaging System, a system used to exchange short text content on mobile phones) 
chat, with the aim to guiding themselves in the actual space, towards the goal to reach 
a physical co-presence. Below, we will report the exchange transcript (Table 1) and 
the reference to the city map (Fig. 1). 
                                                           
1 We recognise that this first example does not pertain to formal learning situations. However, 
we believe that informal learning as the coordination for a meeting can be assimilated to the 
mechanisms of knowledge construction related to conventional learning 
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Table 1: Transcript of the example conversation. In the third column we coded the transcript 
using the formalisation proposed by Traum [23]  
Agent Msg. # Contrib./Act Message Content [Actual Action] Map.# 
A 1 initiate / 
initiateI(1) 
Can we meet at St. Francis 
church at 9? 
[Standing in “x”] 1 
B 2 ReqRepairR(1) Ok. Where is it? I am at the 
St. Paul ‘s station. 
[Standing in “y”] 1 
A 3 repairI(1) Go to the central plaza. Take 
left and the first right. Then 
the first left. See ya 
[Standing in “x”] 1 
B 4 ackR(1) Ok. I am on my way. [Walking towards 
“z”] 
2 
B 5 ReqRepairR(2) I am lost. No way on left. I 
took right at the first junc-
tion but there were two 
streets. I took right again. 
[Walking back to-
wards “j”] 
3 
A 6 re-
pairI(2)ReqAckI(2
) 
No, sorry. There you must stay 
on the main road. You should 
see me. 
[Walking towards 
“k”] 
3 
B 7 ackR(2) Ok.  [Walking towards 
“k”] 
4 
A 8 initiateI(3) I am waiting at the red cross 
on the left hand side of the 
st. 
[Standing in “k”] 4 
B 9 ackR(3)ReqAckR(3) Found the red cross office. 
Where are you? 
[Standing in “w”] 5 
A 10 can-
celI(3)initiateI(
4) 
No, sorry it was another cross 
:-) Keep going for another two 
blocks. 
[Standing in “k”] 5 
B 11 ackR(4) Ok. [Walking towards 
“k”] 
5 
 
     
Map. 1 Map. 2 Map. 3 Map. 4 Map. 5 
Fig. 1: Map references used in the transcript at Table 1 
If we try to model the described situation using Clark and Shaefer's Contribution 
Model1989 [5], or Traum's Grounding Acts Model1999 [22], we reach the conclusion that 
A and B have grounded their conversation at each acknowledgment. More precisely: 
once both presentation and acceptance phases have been completed, the peers will 
have grounded a certain contribution (at utterance n. 4, 7, 9, 11). This architecture is 
based on the assumptions that the provision of evidences of reception is enough to 
infer the understanding of the signal and the corresponding incorporation in the con-
tributor's beliefs. When using these models, it is difficult to explain a lack of under-
standing, as in the example provided when B leads to point "z", because B provided 
clearly evidence of acceptance as per message 4, on Table 1.  
Our claim is that in order to take into account the complexity of this kind of 
interaction we need to look at the situation from a knowledge construction point of 
view. From there, we argue, new descriptors of grounding are needed. Therefore, to 
stay with our example, we can say that the respondent B had an illusion of grounding 
between point "y" and point "j", until s/he realised that multiple solutions were possi-
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tween point "y" and point "j", until s/he realised that multiple solutions were possible 
and s/he did not have enough information to solve the ambiguity. 
1.2   Example B 
The second example was collected in a study of using asynchronous discussion 
groups for the collaborative processing of academic texts [24]. This example serves 
mainly to show the fuzzy, ambiguous nature of communication when talking about 
abstract concepts, and the more nuanced levels of grounding that have to be distin-
guished. To fully illustrate this point, we would have to give an account of a whole 
discussion thread with 10 or 20 messages where students try to make sense of their 
subject matter. Then we would see a conversation that ‘in form’ would behave like 
the contribution theory describes, while it still would be very hard to determine how 
the different messages relate to one another on a knowledge level. Often, while all 
messages roughly concern the same topic and all consist of slightly different points of 
view, it will remain unclear whether anyone understood someone else’s message, or 
whether any new knowledge was ‘build’ (see Fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig. 2: Sample from an electronic discussion between university students. Grammatical errors 
were copied, to give a correct impression of the original ambiguities 
The second message, which aims to provide ‘some more clarity’ on the abstract 
subject of Laurillard’s account of 'phenomenography', can be considered as an attempt 
for grounding at a knowledge level. The most important aspect of this follow up mes-
sage, is that it present a certain gradual ‘topic drift’: the question “what is phe-
nomenography” is answered by a message about the question “how does Laurillard 
evaluate phenomenography”. This topic drift results in the fact that existing views are 
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being exchanged, but because of a lack of relevance of one message to another, little 
new knowledge can be build. 
2   Four Dimensions of Grounding at a Micro and Macro Levels 
Using the presented examples, we will now elaborate on the difference between the 
micro and macro level, in four interrelated dimensions (see Fig. 3). Firstly, our exam-
ples show that the broad range of possible meanings on a knowledge level makes 
grounding more difficult, and is more likely to result in partial understanding then at a 
conversation level. Secondly, when it comes to measuring successful grounding, we 
propose to look at levels of commitment and co-referenced action, which might dem-
onstrate (degrees of) shared knowledge better then acknowledgements. Thirdly, we 
will look at the underlying principles and see that because grounding is essentially 
efficiency-driven, the notion of ‘effort’ plays a central, but different, role at both lev-
els. Finally, we will investigate where this effort is or should be directed and identify 
of perspective taking [13] as a primal grounding mechanisms on the knowledge level. 
 
Fig. 3: A four-component model of grounding at utterance and knowledge levels 
2.1 Manifest Meaning 
 
Knowledge can never be accessed directly. As Laurillard [16] states, we have to infer 
conceptual information (‘descriptions of the world’) from the physical or communica-
tive interactions we make in this world, thus making abstract learning, or communi-
cating about knowledge, an essentially mediated phenomenon. Since this mediation is 
never perfect, and ‘common ground’ can never be reached completely ([11] referring 
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to Wittgenstein), we will use the notion of ‘mutual cognitive environment’ instead 
[25]. Sperber and Wilson define a cognitive environment as the set of facts that are 
‘manifest’ at a certain moment to a person: the facts that he or she is capable of repre-
senting and accepting as true or probably true. Or, in our words, what is manifest for a 
certain person is the range of possible meaning that is evoked or triggered by the 
presented evidence, in a certain context. This collection of meanings that are associ-
ated to a certain action, concept or statement can even be so broad that it includes 
contradictory points of view [3]. The difference with Clarks description of common 
ground, is that to say two people share a cognitive environment does not imply they 
make the same assumptions; merely that they are capable of doing so. 
While Clark’s experiments started from the idea that a piece information x is ei-
ther known or unknown to person A or B, the notion of 'manifestness' shows that there 
are also many degrees in between, and many different ways of ‘knowing piece of 
information x’. We can say that the bigger the overlap is between the manifest mean-
ings of different conversation partners, the more successful their grounding. When 
looking at the two levels we distinguished, we can state that the need for a notion of 
‘groundedness’, which can account for subtle differences in interpretation, is even 
greater at a knowledge level than it is at an utterance level. Or, as Andriessen and 
Alargamot ([1], p. 8) put it: “semantic understanding is something gradual”. Also, the 
smaller and more focused a range of manifest meanings is, the better the chances for 
successful grounding. This depends on what one is grounding: an intention or speech 
act, a literal meaning, a statement, or a certain point of view. The more elaborate and 
complex the grounding object, the more difficult grounding. Because the range of 
possible interpretations will usually be broader at the knowledge level than at the 
utterance level, grounding will also be more difficult at that level, and “a communica-
tive intention can be fulfilled without the corresponding informative intention being 
fulfilled” [25]. We would like to see the distinction between the micro and the macro 
level not strictly as a dichotomy, but rather as a range, for instance going from recog-
nizing simple intentions, to recognizing literal meanings, more elaborated statements 
and finally complex points of view. 
2.2 Evidence of Successful Grounding 
 
In concordance with Sperber and Wilson’s account of the evidence that messages 
provide to guide their interpretation, the same can be said about analysing grounding. 
The more evidence we have, the more we know about the levels of shared understand-
ing (though it may never be conclusive). As we have stated in the introduction, we do 
not think acknowledgements are always a valid measure of shared understanding. 
Apart from different goals at the two levels (see 2.4), Ross, Green and House [20] 
have shown that an (partial) ‘illusion of shared knowledge’ is not only possible, but 
also even likely to occur (called the false consensus effect). Therefore we propose to 
look at verbal and physical actions as well. Bereiter’s term ‘knowledgeability’ [3], or 
‘being able to take intelligent action’, indicates that (verbal or physical) actions intrin-
sically contain knowledge. In our first Example 1.1 the ‘information bearing actions’ 
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one can identify are the coordination of tuning attempts with the agreed plan. If the 
pair agree to a certain strategy and then implement it coherently, we can infer that the 
pair successfully grounded to a high degree. Or, to state it more generally, if someone 
‘commits to a previous statement, and subsequently does something directly related to 
it in the forthcoming action or statement’ (we use this notion of commitment in ac-
cord with [8]). Since this relatedness between communicative actions requires a large 
overlap in the cognitive context and shared referents, we will label them as co-
referenced actions. 
In the asynchronous discussion groups (Example 1.2) we can look at the align-
ment of questions and answers.  An answer that follows a question seems like a le-
gitimate and useful speech act (utterance level), but only if the relevance of the con-
tent is established, we can deduce if it is also a successful knowledge-building act. On 
a knowledge level, for an action to be ‘co-referenced’, it is required that it refers to a 
shared piece of knowledge and needs to be relevant from someone else’s view. Ac-
cording to Sperber & Wilson: “something is relevant to an individual when it con-
nects with background information he has available to yield conclusions that matter 
to him: say, by answering a question he had in mind, improving his knowledge on a 
certain topic, settling a doubt, confirming a suspicion, or correcting a mistaken im-
pression.” ([26], p. 608). Our examples show that, while at an utterance level, both 
recognising a certain speech act, (such as identify a question by its question mark) and 
providing a relevant response (giving an answer) is pretty straightforward, on knowl-
edge level the requirements for action to be relevant or co-referenced are much 
higher.  
2.3 Grounding Mechanisms 
At an utterance level, human communication is very efficient by investing minimal 
effort in elaborate message design or conscientious interpretation, but rather by jump-
ing to (subjective) conclusions and repairing a possible misunderstanding after it 
arises. At a knowledge level however, we have seen that because of the mediated 
nature of grounding and the more complex collections of associated (manifest) mean-
ings, this presents more problems. Miscommunication can be both harder to detect 
(thus cannot be relied upon to reveal itself) and to repair. Therefore, the grounding 
mechanisms at the knowledge level might present the most important shift from the 
utterance level. To understand what nuanced meaning other people attribute to certain 
statements, one must ‘put oneself in the other’s shoes’ and try to identify which mean-
ing will be relevant for that person [25]. In order to infer someone else’s cognitive 
environment or ‘frame of reference’, both for reading and writing messages (audience 
design), we rely on strategies like perspective taking [13] and mutual modeling (for a 
definition see [18]). 
While at an utterance level repair mechanisms are know to be self-regulating (the 
less shared understanding, the more grounding will take place, see for example [10]), 
this is less evident for knowledge level perspective taking. It seems that at this level, 
the ‘chicken & the egg’ relation between grounding and common ground (“It is hard 
to find some if you don’t have some already and you don’t have any unless you find 
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it”, [15], p. 4) is even more prevalent than it is at the utterance level. This shows that 
at a macro level, knowledge of other’s perspectives plays a role as a prerequisite as 
well as an outcome and the same goes for one’s knowledge of the subject matter. 
Because identifying another’s frame of reference is easier if one has knowledge of the 
different possible frames of reference that exist, perspective taking is also tied to 
existing knowledge. This underlines the reciprocal relationship between individual 
and collective processes in collaborative learning [22]: it is not only so that individual 
learning results from collaborative processes, but individual knowledge also influ-
ences the success of collaboration. 
2.4 Grounding Principles 
First of all, grounding is functional and driven by mechanisms of efficiency, as Clark 
& Wilkes-Gibbs [6] demonstrate with their ‘principle of least collaborative effort’ and 
Wilson and Sperber [25] in their ‘relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure’. The 
fact that in grounding: no more effort will be invested that what is ‘sufficient’, can 
explain the lack of co-referenced actions in our examples. For students the costs (rela-
tive to the goals) may simply be too high, especially because high-level learning goals 
are usually translated into practical tasks, with which students deal in a pragmatic 
way. Taking the perspective of someone else may take more effort than staying within 
one’s own perspective, and what is ‘sufficient to continue the conversation’ might not 
be ‘sufficient for learning’ [2]. That is why, for learning, instead of trying to ‘mini-
mize the collaborative effort’, we strive for an: optimal collaborative effort [9]. 
The effect of effort into perspective taking and co-referenced actions is twofold: 
not only does relevant feedback enhance collaborative knowledge building, but the 
effort after shared meaning itself is also strongly associated with learning [21], espe-
cially if the effort is directed at the knowledge level (or ‘semantic grounding’, see 
[2]). Spending effort into trying to understand another perspective is learning: it is 
leaving one’s preconceptions and trying to new information and insights. The is also 
true for reading, since perspective taking for comprehending messages is closely 
related to the comprehending process when studying scientific texts. 
3   Conclusions 
Context is inextricably present when we grasp meanings and when we infer knowl-
edge. The pragmatic tradition of relevance highlights the action-oriented nature of 
intelligence, where the term ‘action’ is to be understood in a broad sense that includes 
reasoning behaviour, or communicative acts [7]. 
When looking at the relevance of communicative actions in collaborative learning, 
we have described that providing evidence and acting in a co-referenced way is cru-
cial for developing a shared understanding. The more evidence is presented, the easier 
it becomes to take another’s perspective, act in a co-referenced way and enhance the 
degree of shared understanding. 
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We suggest the implications for design and research on grounding in collaborative 
learning might involve an effort to facilitate grounding at a knowledge level. For 
instance, communication tools could be developed that provide more (focused and 
detailed) contextual information which serves to limit the range of manifest meanings 
of the concepts that are being used, and thus to increase the chances of shared under-
standing. Also, since the use of acknowledgements as markers of shared understand-
ing, is problematic, we propose to create markers that can give an account of the rele-
vance of communicative actions in regards to the reasoning process. As an example of 
this, we think ‘operationalising’ the ‘co-referencedness’ of actions on a knowledge 
level, as measure of shared understanding, would be a valuable effort. As a final re-
mark, we want to conclude with a question for discussion: 
- How can we ‘operationalise’ the concept of Perspective Taking? 
The concept of co-referenced action, as defined in this paper, presents several limita-
tions. It is sometimes difficult to have a multi-modality of communication that may 
make visible incongruences between intentions and actuations. We need other mark-
ers. Relevance theory states that an input is relevant when, and only when, its process-
ing yields a positive cognitive effect [25], meaning that the receiver of the input will 
generate and act an expectation of a particular cognitive effect to be achieved by the 
incoming input [27]. These ‘acts’ of expectation may be observed and accounted as 
yielding back to the reasoning and inference process of the learner and on the particu-
lar perspective s/he is taking in relation to the processed input.  
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